We consider the partitioning of a society i n to coalitions in purely hedonic settings i.e., where each p l a yer's payo is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We rst discuss how hedonic and non-hedonic settings di er and some su cient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings. We then focus on a weaker stability condition: individual stability, where no player can bene t from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition. We show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. Examples show that without these conditions, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss some other stability concepts, and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties.
Introduction
Coalition formation is of fundamental importance in a wide variety of social, economic, and political problems, ranging from communication and trade to legislative v oting. As such, there is much about the formation of coalitions that deserves study. In this paper, we examine the purely hedonic aspect of coalition formation. This terminology follows Dr eze and Greenberg (1980) , who call the dependence of a player's utility o n the identity of the members of her coalition the \hedonic aspect". Essentially, the purely hedonic problem that we examine here boils coalition formation down to its purest social form: the payo to a player depends only on the composition of members of the coalition to which she belongs.
Examples of situations where players' preferences in coalition formation are hedonic include the formation of social clubs, groups, and organizations, as well as faculties, teams, and societies. Situations where preferences are derived from activities that a group will undertake, such as the provision of a public good, are also hedonic provided that a player's preferences depend only on the members of her own coalition and not on the composition of other coalitions. For instance, if a coalition median votes on a level of public good to provide, then a player can predict the public good level that will be provided by di erent coalitions and evaluate coalitions by k n o wing their membership. More generally, m a n y situations where players form groups and then each group chooses from a set of available alternatives can be reduced to hedonic settings, if reliable predictions can be formed from the beginning about each group's subsequent choice.
While the stability of coalition partitions where players have preferences over members of their coalition has been examined in a number of models (especially those where there are local public goods or some sort of political interaction as in Guesnerie and Oddou (1981) , Weber (1986, 1993) , Demange (1994) , among others), 1 the purely hedonic model covers interesting settings and issues that have not been previously studied. 2 We discuss the di erences in more detail in Section 2. 1 There is also the large literature on the marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) , assignment games of Shapley and Shubik (1972) , as well as various o -shoots (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) ). 2 A notable exception to this is Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997). They examine the formation of jurisdictions where voters anticipate a median vote over a level of public good supplied. Their model has a continuum of players and so does not t into the de nition of hedonic settings explored here, but it is still an example of a model where preferences are hedonic. We refer the reader to Jehiel and Scotchmer for some interesting comparisons of various rules for admission into a jurisdiction.
The focus of our paper is on the existence of stable coalition partitions in the hedonic model. While there are some hedonic settings where there exist core stable coalition partitions, as discussed in Section 4, 3 there are many where there do not, and yet there still exist partitions, stable in a non-cooperative sense. The main results of this paper relate to the existence of stable coalition partitions when only individual movements are allowed, so that only one individual considers changing her coalition at a time.
Non-cooperative stability tests makes sense if players are small relative to the size of coalitions or if the cost of coordinating movements to form a new coalition is high. Examples one might h a ve in mind include professors considering changing universities, soccer players considering changing teams, individuals changing communities where their public goods and taxes are decided, and individuals considering changing clubs. 4 One notion that we examine is that of individual stability. This concept is based on the concept of \individually stable equilibrium" from a non-hedonic model by Greenberg (1978) and Dr eze and Greenberg (1980) but is modi ed to apply to the purely hedonic setting where no allocations of goods need to be kept track of. A coalition partition is individually stable if it is immune to individual movements which bene t the moving player and do not hurt any member of the coalition she joins.
We begin by showing that if preferences are additively separable and symmetric (i.e., players have the same reciprocal values for each other), then the set of individually stable coalition partitions is nonempty. W e a l s o s h o w that with such preferences, the set of Nash stable coalition partitions is nonempty, where Nash stability is a noncooperative notion of stability that is stronger than individual stability in the sense that players do not need permission to join a new coalition. However, we show t h a t if these conditions on preferences are weakened slightly (for instance, symmetry is weakened to mutuality w h e r e a n y t wo p l a yers have v alues of the same sign for each other, but not necessary of the same magnitude), then the set of individually stable coalition structures can be empty.
Next, we consider preferences that depend on some underlying summary characteristic of a coalition, and where players have single peaked preferences over these sum-mary characteristics. Examples that t into the setting we examine include situations where players care only about the size of their coalitions, but not about the identities of the members of the coalition, or where a coalition takes a median vote over a level of a public good to produce and players care only about that choice of the coalition. Somewhat surprisingly, e v en when preferences are anonymous and single-peaked, the set of Nash stable outcomes can be empty. Nevertheless, these requirements guarantee the existence of an individually stable coalition partition and we p r o vide an algorithm for identifying such a partition. Moreover, we s h o w that the partitions that the algorithm identi es are weakly Pareto e cient a s w ell as individually stable. We go on to show that single-peakedness of preferences is important to the existence of an individually stable coalition partition.
Towards the end of the paper, we also discuss an even weaker notion of stability called contractual individual stability, again adapted to the purely hedonic model from a notion of Dr eze and Greenberg (1980) that applied to non-hedonic models. We conclude with some examples and remarks regarding other axiomatic properties in hedonic coalition formation, such as strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and population monotonicity.
A Comparison of the Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Settings
It is useful to begin our discussion with a look at an example that highlights the di erences between the hedonic and non-hedonic settings, and o ers motivation for some of our analysis. It is a standard Tiebout-style local public good model.
A set N = f1 : : : n g of players is divided into coalitions. Each coalition selects a level of public good to consume. Public good consumption is local and so a player consumers only the public good produced by her coalition. What is feasible for a coalition depends on its size. A coalition S N can produce any a m o u n t of public good in 0 #S]. So, each member of the coalition brings a unit of the public good to the coalition and there is free disposal. Let individuals have single-peaked preferences, denoted i , o ver the amount of public good that they consume, with each individual's peak lying in 0 n ]. 5 First, let us consider a standard non-hedonic version of this setting. In the spirit of Greenberg and Weber (1993) and Demange (1994) , let an \outcome" be a partition o f N and a speci cation of a public good choice c S 2 0 #S] for each S 2 . An outcome cis core stable if it cannot be improved upon by a n y coalition. 6 That is cis core stable if for any S 0 N and c S 0 2 0 #S 0 ] there exists i 2 S 0 with c S i i c S 0 , where S i is the element of containing i. If preferences are continuous, then it follows from the results of Greenberg and Weber (1993) (see also Demange (1994) ) that there exists an outcome that is core stable.
Next, let us turn to a hedonic version of the model. Suppose that the manner in which a coalition S chooses c S is by a median vote of its members over 0 #S]. For simplicity, if there is an even numberof voters then choose the lower of the two medians. The model is now purely hedonic: once a coalition is speci ed then its members can predict the choice of public good that will be selected by the median vote, assuming that players follow their dominant strategies of voting for their most preferred public good level in 0 #S]. So, each p l a yer's induced preferences over coalitions depend only on the membership of the coalitions and are thus purely hedonic.
We c a n n o w de ne core stability notion for the hedonic setting. Let m(S) denote the median voting outcome for coalition S over 0 #S] as described above. We c a n de ne preferences over coalitions by s a ying that S i S 0 if and only if m(S) i m(S 0 ). A coalition partition is core stable in the hedonic model if for every S 0 N there exists i 2 S 0 such t h a t S i i S 0 , where S i is the element of containing i.
In contrast with the non-hedonic version of the model, there does not always exist a core stable partition, as we show in the following example. 7 
Example 1
Let n = 7 a n d h a ve players' preference peaks over levels of the public good be p 1 = p 2 = 4 , p 3 = 5, and p 4 = p 5 = p 6 = p 7 = 7. Also, players 1 and 2 prefer 3 units to 5 units of the public good, and 6 units to 2 units. Player 3 prefers 3 units to 6 units and 6 units to 2 units. 6 The on core stability distinguishes this notion from the hedonic one that we will use in this paper. 7 See Haeringer (2000) for an examination of a related model where players care about both the size and choice of a coalition. He provides conditions on preferences su cient for the existence of core-like and Tiebout (Nash) stable coalition structures.
In the non-hedonic version of the model, ( c ) = ( fNg 5 ) -a l l p l a yers grouped together and consuming 5 units of the public good, is a core stable outcome.
In the hedonic version of the model, however, there does not exist a core stable partition. To see this, note that a partition must have a group with least 5 members in order to be core stable or else the partition is blocked by f3 4 5 6 7g. A n y partition that contains a group of 6 or more members and contains all of f4 5 6 7g will have the large group produce m(S) 6 and will be blocked by f1 2 3g which w i l l h a ve m(S) = 3. A partition that contains a group of 6 players and leaves one of f4 5 6 7g single, will be blocked by the single player together with players 1 and 2. So a core stable partition have to consist of a group of 5 and a group of 2. The partition ff1 2g f3 4 5 6 7gg is blocked by f1 2 4 5 6 7g. T h us, a core stable partition would have to be of the form fS 1 S 2 g with #S 2 = 5 and f1 2g \ S 2 6 = . Without loss of generality, consider a partition where 1 2 S 2 . This is blocked by S 2 f 1g, and so no partition is core stable.
The above example shows that the hedonic model where a coalition's actions are predicted, has di erent properties than the non-hedonic model. 8 For the Greenberg and Weber allocation to be stable, the coalition must be able to commit not to choose according to median voting. In this example, which of the analyses would be appropriate would depend on the method by w h i c h coalitions choose the level of public good.
While there does not always exist a core stable partition in the hedonic version of the model above, there always exists an individually stable partition, as we shall prove below. Individual stability only considers blocking by coalitions that are formed by having one player leave her current coalition and join another coalition in the partition (or move to be single). In the example above, an individually stable partition is ff1 2g f3 4 5 6 7gg. P l a yer 3 is worse o if 1 or 2 join the larger coalition, and so closes the larger coalition to their entrance, and no player in the larger coalition wishes to join 1 and 2. Moreover, this partition is Pareto optimal.
De nitions and notation
The core and Nash stability de nitions provided below are based on standard de nitions in the literature, while individual stability de nitions below are adapted from Greenberg (1978) and Dr eze and Greenberg (1980) . 9 Consider a nite set of players N = f1 : : : n g. A coalition partition is a set = fS k g K k=1 which partitions N. T h us, S k N are disjoint a n d K k=1 S k = N. The subsets S k are called coalitions. Each individual has preferences over possible coalition partitions which are entirely determined by the coalition that she belongs to. Thus, a player i's preferences can be represented by an order i (a complete, re exive, and transitive binary relation) over the set fS k N : i 2 S k g. W e let i denote the associated asymmetric binary relation.
Given and i, let S (i) denote the set S k 2 s u c h that i 2 S k .
A game (N ) is set of players and a pro le of preferences.
Properties of Preferences:
A player i's preferences are additively separable if there exists a function v i : N ! IR such t h a t 8S 1 S 2 3 i where #S denotes the size of a coalition S. 9 The hedonic model we de ne here is independently studied by Banerjee, Konishi and S onmez (1998) who focus on core stability, as discussed in the next section.
A player i's preferences on some set f0 1 : : : K g 10 As an example, i's preferences might depend only on the size of the coalition that i is a member of and might be single-peaked on size.
E ciency A coalition partition is weakly Pareto e cient for any partition 0 6 = there exists a player i such that S 0 (i) 6 = S (i) a n d S (i) i S 0(i).
In this version of weak Pareto e ciency, a coalition partition o ers improvement over another if all players whose coalitions change are made strictly better o . The restriction of attention to players whose coalitions have c hanged makes this de nition stronger than the usual de nition of weak Pareto e ciency. I f p l a yers' preferences are strict, then weak Pareto e ciency coincides with Pareto e ciency.
Stability concepts:
A coalition partition is core stable (or in the core) i f 6 9T N such that T i S (i) for all i 2 T. When a coalition partition is not core stable, so that 9T N such that T i S (i) for all i 2 T, w e s a y that T blocks . A coalition partition is Nash stable if 8i S (i) i S k f ig for all S k 2 f g. A coalition structure is individually stable if there do not exist i 2 N and a coalition S k 2 f g such t h a t S k f ig i S (i), and S k f ig j S k for all j 2 S k .
In line with individual stability, a coalition is said to be open if there is some player that could be added to the coalition without making any of the current m e m bers worse o , and a coalition is said to be closed, otherwise.
A coalition structure is contractually individually stable if there do not exist i 2 N and a coalition S k 2 f g, such that S k f ig i S (i), S k f ig j S k 8j 2 S k and S (i)=fig j S (i) 8j 2 S (i)=fig.
Note that individual stability implies individual rationality, since nobody wants to leave her current coalition and stay alone.
The relation between the stability concepts is indicated below, where ) indicates that if a partition satis es the rst notion, then it also satis es the second.
Individual stability ) contractual individual stability. Nash stability ) individual stability ) contractual individual stability. However, core stability 6 ) Nash stability 6 ) core stability. Also, core stability 6 ) individual stability, because our core stability notion is the one of weak core.
The following examples illustrate these relationships.
Example 2 An undesired guest. 11 Let N = f1 2 3g and f1 2g 1 f1g 1 f1 2 3g 1 f1 3g f1 2g 2 f2g 2 f1 2 3g 2 f2 3g f1 2 3g 3 f2 3g 3 f1 3g 3 f3g:
These orderings can be represented by additively separable utilities. Here, ff1 2g f3gg is in the core and is individually stable, while the set of Nash stable partitions is empty since 3 would like to join with 1 and 2, who would then prefer to be alone.
Example 3 Two is company, three i s a c r owd.
Let N = f1 2 3g and f1 2g 1 f1 3g 1 f1 2 3g 1 f1g f2 3g 2 f2 1g 2 f1 2 3g 2 f2g f3 1g 3 f3 2g 3 f1 2 3g 3 f3g:
These preferences have a cycle: the rst player prefers the second player to the third, the second player prefers the third player to the rst, and the third player prefers the 11 Dr eze and Greenberg (1980) consider a di erent example by the same name.
rst one to the second. All players prefer to be in some couple over being all together, and being alone is the worst outcome. Here, the core is empty, w h i l e ff1 2 3gg is the unique Nash stable partition, as well as being the unique individually stable partition.
Example 4 Let N = f1 2 3g and f1 2g 1 f1 3g 1 f1g 1 f1 2 3g f2 3g 2 f2 1g 2 f2g 2 f1 2 3g f3 1g 3 f3 2g 3 f3g 3 f1 2 3g:
This is similar to the previous example except that staying alone is better than being in the grand coalition. Here, there does not exist a core stable, Nash stable, or individually stable coalition partition. Nevertheless, there are three contractually individually stable coalition structures: | ff1 2g f3gg, ff1 3g f2gg and ff2 3g f1gg.
Core Stability
Before moving to the main focus of our analysis on individual stability, w e provide some idea of what one can say about the existence of core stable partitions. As mentioned in the introduction, Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez (1998) identify two conditions, the top coalition and the weak top coalition property, that are su cient for the existence of a core stable partition in the hedonic model. In addition to those conditions, one can easily adapt conditions from the NTU cooperative game literature that are distinct from their weak top coalition property. These conditions capture applications, such a s m ulti-sided matching problems, that are not captured by the weak top coalition property. We state each of these conditions and then show t h a t they are all distinct.
In order to state the rst two conditions, note that the hedonic setting can be thought of as an NTU game where the allocations of a coalition are unique. This is more formally stated as follows: Thus, a game is ordinally balanced if for each balanced family of coalitions there exists some coalition partition such that each p l a yer prefers her coalition in the partition to her worst coalition in the balanced family.
Consecutiveness
The following de nitions are adaptations of corresponding de nitions for NTU games by Greenberg and Weber (1986) and Greenberg (1994) .
An ordering of players is a bijection f : N ! N.
A coalition S N is consecutive with respect to an ordering f, i f f(i) < f (j) < f(k), i 2 S, a n d k 2 S imply j 2 S.
A g a m e ( N f i g i2N ) i s weakly consecutive if there exists an ordering of players, f, such that whenever is defeated by some T, there exists T 0 that is consecutive w i t h respect to f that defeats .
A g a m e ( N f i g i2N ) i s consecutive if there exists an ordering of players, f, such that S i fig for some i implies that S is consecutive with respect to f.
A partition is consecutive with respect to an ordering f, i f e a c h S 2 is consecutive with respect to f.
Theorem 1 Adapted from Scarf (1967) and Greenberg (1994) ] 13 If a game is ordinally balanced, then there exists a core stable coalition partition. If a game (N ) is weakly consecutive with respect to an ordering f, then there exists a core s t a b l e c oalition partition that is consecutive with respect to f.
Let us now examine the relationship between the various su cient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions. The following properties are shown to be su cient for the existence of a core stable coalition partition by Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez (1998).
Given a non-empty set of players V N, a non-empty subset S V is a topcoalition of V if for any i 2 S and any T V with i 2 T we h a ve S i T. A game satis es the top coalition property i f f o r a n y non-empty set of players V N, there exists a top-coalition of V . Given a non-empty set of players V N, a non-empty subset S V is a weak top-coalition of V if it has an ordered partition fS 1 : : : Sg such that (i) for any i 2 S 1 and any T V with i 2 T we h a ve S i T and (ii) for any k > 1, any i 2 S k , a n d a n y T V with i 2 T, w e h a ve T i S ) T The following proposition outlines the relationship between these top coalition properties, and the ordinal balance and the weak consecutive properties that de ned above.
Proposition 1 A game that satis es the top coalition property is weakly consecutive, if players' preferences are strict. The weak top coalition property, the weak consecutive property, and the ordinal balance p r operty are c ompletely distinct (even with strict preferences): for any given property there exists a game that satis es the given property but fails to satisfy the other two.
The relationship missing from the above proposition is the relationship between the top coalition property and ordinal balance. The top coalition property d o e s n o t necessarily imply ordinal balance, which can be seen through game 5 in Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez (1998).
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that a game satis es the top coalition property. W e show t h a t i t i s w eakly consecutive. Identify a top coalition of N. Call it S 1 . I d e n tify a top coalition of N=S 1 , c a l l i t S 2 , and so on, de ning S 3 : : : S K in this manner. De ne the ordering f, b y assigning values 1 : : : #S 1 to the members of S 1 (in any order -so that f(i) 2 f 1 : : : #S 1 g for each i 2 S 1 ). Assign values #S 1 + 1 : : : #S 1 + # S 2 to the members of S 2 , and so on. Now, consider any that is blocked by some S. I t m ust be that 6 = fS 1 S 2 : : : S K g, as that is clearly a core stable partition. So, nd the lowest index k such that S k = 2 . Since S k is a top coalition of N= j<k S j , it follows that is blocked by S k , w h i c h is consecutive under the ordering f.
The following example is of a game that is weakly consecutive, but does not satisfy the weak top coalition or ordinal balance properties. Let N = f1 2 3g and f1 2g 1 f1 3g 1 f1g 1 f1 2 3g f1 2 3g 2 f2 3g 2 f1 2g 2 f2g f1 2 3g 3 f2 3g 3 f1 3g 3 f3g:
This is weakly consecutive w h e n f is set by the identity, since the only coalition that is not consecutive, f1 3g, only blocks the partition ff1g f2g f3gg, w h i c h is also blocked by f1 2g.
This game does not satisfy the weak top coalition property as there is no weak top coalition of N. The only candidates are (i) f1 2 3g, which cannot be a weak top coalition since player 1 prefers f1g and thus cannot be put in the necessary ordered partition of f1 2 3g in the de nition, and (ii) f1 2g which cannot be a weak top coalition since player 2 can form a better coalition with player 3. This game does not satisfy ordinal balance relative to the balanced family of coalitions B = ff1 2g f2 3g f1 3g. A n y partition with at least on singleton player cannot make the singleton player as well o as in the coalitions in B, and the only other partition is ff1 2 3gg, which l e a ves player 1 worse o than in the coalitions in B.
The following game satis es the weak top coalition property, but is not weakly consecutive and does not satisfy the ordinal balance condition. Let N = f1 2 3g and f1 2 3g 1 f1 2g 1 f1 3g 1 f1g f2 3g 2 f1 2g 2 f1 2 3g 2 f2g f1 3g 3 f1 2 3g 3 f2 3g 3 f3g:
First, we c heck that the game satis es the weak top coalition property. A w eak top coalition of N is f1 2 3g with corresponding partition S 1 = f1g, S 2 = f3g, a n d S 3 = f2g. A w eak top coalition of any V that is a strict subset of N is simply V with S 1 = V . Second, we c heck that this game is not weakly consecutive. The only coalition that blocks ff1 2g f3gg is f2 3g. The only coalition that blocks ff1 3g f2gg is f1 2g. The only coalition that blocks ff2 3g f1gg is f1 3g. There is no f for which e a c h of these blocking coalitions is consecutive. Third, we c heck that this game is not ordinally balanced. Consider the balanced family B = ff1 2g f2 3g f1 3gg. No partition that has any p l a yer remaining single can satisfy the requirement of ordinal balance relative to this B since remaining single is least preferred for all players. The only possibility is then the partition ff1 2 3gg. However, player 2 prefers both f1 2g and f2 3g to f1 2 3g, and so ordinal balance cannot be satis ed. Finally, The following game satis es ordinal balance, but is not weakly consecutive nor does it satisfy the weak top coalition property. L e t N = f1 2 3g with preferences: f1 2g 1 f1 2 3g 1 f1 3g 1 f1g f2 3g 2 f1 2 3g 2 f1 2g 2 f2g f1 3g 3 f1 2 3g 3 f2 3g 3 f3g:
To see that the above game satis es ordinal balance, notice that the only balanced families for which the partition ff1 2 3gg does not satisfy the condition, have some pair of players in only one coalition. Thus, they are of the form B = ffi jg fkgg, which is in fact a partition. To see that the above g a m e i s n o t w eakly consecutive, (given the symmetry of preferences) set f(1) = 1: If f(2) = 2, then there is no consecutive blocking coalition to the partition ff2 3g f1gg, a s o n l y f1 3g blocks. If f(3) = 2, then there is no consecutive blocking coalition to ff1 3g f2gg, a s o n l y f1 2g blocks. v ij . Therefore, any coalition structure which maximizes the above sum is Nash stable. Such a maximizer exists given the nite number of possible partitions.
The proof of Proposition 2 uses symmetry in a critical way. There may fail to exist a stable coalition partition if symmetry is weakened to mutuality, e v en when preferences are additively separable and mutual. As an easy example of non-existence of a Nash stable coalition partition with such preferences let N = 3 a n d v 1 (2) = 2, v 2 (1) = 1, v 1 (3) = ;1, v 3 (1) = ;2, v 2 (3) = 2, v 3 (2) = 1. The next example shows that an individually stable coalition partition may fail to exist even when preferences are additively separable, mutual, and single peaked on a tree. This example is adapted from one in Banerjee, Konishi and S onmez (1998), where they show nonexistence of a core allocation. While the domain of additively separable and symmetric preferences is of some interest, it is a very limited one. For instance, it does not capture the setting we discussed in Section 2 surrounding Example 1. We n o w turn to a domain that includes the local public good setting of Example 1 as a special case. We provide a proof of the existence of an individually stable (and weakly Pareto e cient) coalition partition for this domain.
Ordered Characteristics
Each coalition S 6 = is described by a c haracteristic or choice c(S) that lies in f0 1 : : : #Sg.
14 As noted by Banerjee, Konishi and S onmez (1998), the preferences in this example fail to be single-peaked on a tree but are easily extended to be such. Add players 6 and 7 such that . Condition (i) says that if a choice is not capacity constrained, then it must choose the peak of some player. The rst part of condition (ii) says that when comparing coalitions that di er by the identity of exactly one of the players, the choices of the coalitions are ordered by the peaks of the players who di er. The second part of (ii) states that the di erence between these players cannot matter if a player with a peak smaller then the coalitional choice is replaced by another player with a peak not higher than hers.
Both (i) and (ii) are violated if c(S) i s t a k en as some weighted average of the peaks of coalition members (and indeed such situations fail existence), but are satis ed if it is based on some order statistic of the peaks.
Illustrative examples of settings satisfying having ordered characteristics are as follows.
(1) Players preferences are anonymous and single-peaked on the size of the coalition to which they belong.
(2) As in Section 2, players have preferences over a choice of a level of public good and c(S) = m i n #S median i2S (p i )], with a deterministic tie break if the coalition has an even number of members. (Any order statistic other than median, such as max or min, would also work.)
Consistency
While the ordered characteristics condition places structure on the choices of coalitions, it still allows for some inconsistencies in how those choices may be made across di erent coalitions. For instance, consider the case where the choice is equal to the full capacity of the coalition, except when there are precisely 5 players in the coalition in which case it is the minimum peak. That is, consider c(S) = # S if #S 6 = 6 but c(S) = min i2S p i if #S = 6. This satis es the ordered characteristics condition, but makes life di cult in terms of nding an individually stable and Pareto e cient coalition partition (see Example 8, below)).
A hedonic game that has ordered characteristics is consistent if whenever there exists i and S such t h a t c(S i) = p i < c (S) < min j2S p j , i t f o l l o ws that c(T i) p i for any T.
The consistency condition say s t h a t i f s o m e p l a yer i forces the choice of a coalition to be below the capacity constraint in a situation where the capacity constraint already falls below all of the other coalition members' peaks, then the choice of some other coalition is also no more than i's peak. While this is a very minimal sort of consistency condition, it is enough, under ordered characteristics, to guarantee the existence of an individually stable and Pareto e cient coalition partition.
Theorem 2 If a hedonic game has ordered characteristics, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. If, in addition, consistency is satis ed, then there exist a weakly Pareto e cient individually stable partition. Moreover, an algorithm for identifying an individually stable coalition partition that is weakly Pareto e cient is described b elow.
We state the algorithm below and provide the proof of Theorem 2 in the appendix. Before proceeding with a formal description of the algorithm, we p r o vide some examples that illustrate some of the basic points of the algorithm. We stick to the case where players care only about the size of coalitions, and c(S) = # S. The rst example also shows the contrast with core stability, as it builds on Example 1 of Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez (1998) who show non-existence of a core stable coalition partition. As we see here, there does exist an individually stable and Pareto e cient partition.
The basic idea behind the algorithm is to start by grouping players with the highest peaks together, until we reach a size that exceeds the peak of the next player to be added. Then we start forming a new coalition, and so forth. That will not work in all cases, as we will see in Example 7 below, but serves as a starting point.
Example 6
There are seven players with the anonymous and single peaked preferences : 1 We begin by creating a rst coalition by adding player 7, then 6, 5, 4, and then 3. Player 3 closes the coalition, since the coalition size is 5 and that is 3's peak. Next we form a second coalition by grouping 1 and 2 together. The resulting coalition is f1 2g f3 4 5 6 7g and it is individually stable and weakly Pareto optimal.
Note that there is an interesting implication of Theorem 2, which is illustrated in the context of the above example. The core stable existence problem arises because of instability with respect to intermediate sized coalitions. We k n o w from Theorem 2 that there exist coalition partitions that are stable with respect to both changes by single players and rearrangements made by the grand coalition. In Example 6, it is a coalition of players 1 and 2 joining with 4 to 7 that upsets core stability.
We n o w s h o w some adjustments that are necessary in the basic process described above t o d e v elop the algorithm. Here, beginning by grouping the players with the largest peaks we f o r m f5 6 7 8g . Players 2, 3 and 4, prefer not to go to this largest group so we next form f2 3 4g which gives them each their peak. Next we are left with a singleton f1g. W e h a ve t o a l l o w 1 to join f5 6 7 8g , as the partition is not individually stable as it is, and so we end up with the partition ff2 3 4g f1 5 6 7 8gg. So the algorithm should allow for players to move up to larger coalitions if they are in a coalition smaller than their peak size.
The Algorithm
Order players from 1 to n in increasing order of their peaks. So, i j implies p i p j . Order players with the same peaks in any w ay.
Step 1. Form a coalition S 1 by adding player n. Next, add player n ; 1 i f p n;1 c(fn ; 1 n g). Continue to add players in the reverse order of their labels and add players iteratively as long as p k c(fk : : : n g) and fk + 1 : : : n g is open to k. Stop and do not add player k ; 1 when p k;1 < c (fk ; 1 : : : n g) o r i f fk : : : n g is closed to k ; 1. Call the resulting coalition S 1 . Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Form a coalition S 2 in the same manner from the remaining players, starting with player k ; 1 who was not added in Step 1. If S 1 is closed then proceed to step If a player is moved from S 2 to S 1 , t h e n s e e i f t h e r e i s a p l a yer i who is not yet in a coalition such that p i c(fS 2 ig) a n d S 2 is open to i (taking S 2 in its current form -so without the player who joined S 1 ). If so, add the player to S 2 . Iterate on this procedure, until no players are moved and no players are added to S 2 . Proceed to step 3.
Step 3. Iterate on the procedure described in step 2 with the remaining players. The consistency property is non-redundant i n s h o wing the weak Pareto optimality of a partition constructed by our algorithm. The following example shows that under ordered characteristics, but without consistency, it is possible for the algorithm to nd an individually stable but ine cient coalition partition.
Example 8
There are eight players. Players 1 to 5 have peak at 8, while players 6 to 8 have peak at 4 and prefer more to less. The coalition choice c( ) is de ned as follows. The algorithm from Theorem 2 gives the partition S 1 = f1 2 3 4 5g, S 2 = f6 7 8g, while S = f1 : : : 8g is Pareto superior to it.
We make some further remarks on Theorem 2. These are illustrated with examples for the special case where c(S) = # S, s o p l a yers care only about the size of their coalition.
Even under consistency, Theorem 2 does not imply that all individually stable coalition partitions are (weakly) Pareto optimal. The following example shows that this is not the case, and so the algorithm is important in selecting an individually stable coalition partition that is also Pareto optimal.
Example 9
There are eight players with anonymous and single peaked preferences over the size of their coalition. Players 1 through 4 have a p e a k a t 2 , a n d p l a yers 4 through 8 have peaks at 4. In this case the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 2 nds the Pareto optimal and individually stable (and core stable) coalition partition which is unique up to a relabeling of the players. It is f1 2g f3 4g f5 6 7 8g .
Another individually stable coalition partition is f1 5g f2 6g f3 7g f4 8g. This is Pareto dominated (in a strict sense) by the partition above.
The next example shows that Theorem 2 does not hold beyond the ordered characteristics condition. Without that condition it is possible to nd preference pro les for which the individually stable coalition partitions and the (weakly) Pareto e cient ones are disjoint.
Example 10
There are four players with the following preferences: 134 1 It is easily checked that f1 2 3 4g is the unique individually stable partition. However, it is not Pareto optimal, since everybody prefers the partition f1 2g f3 4g. Next, we s h o w that Theorem 2 does not extend to Nash stability. There may not exist a Nash stable coalition partition, even if preferences are anonymous and single-peaked over size of coalition. A trivial example can make t h i s p o i n t: have t wo individuals with f1 2g 1 f1g and f2g 2 f1 2g. The following example shows that this is also true in less degenerate cases.
Example 11
Consider N = f1 2 3 4g , and the anonymous, single-peaked preferences over coalition sizes described by 4 1 { the partition ff1 2 3 4gg is not Nash stable as player 4 prefers to be alone { a partition of the form ffa b cg fdgg is not Nash stable as playe r s 3 a n d 4 l i k e size 2 better than size 3 and one of them must belong to fa b cg and thus would prefer to leave a n d j o i n d { a partition of the form ffa bg fc dgg is not Nash stable as player 1 would like to switch coalitions since she prefers size 3 to size 2 { a partition of the form ffa bg fcg fdgg is not Nash stable as player c (regardless of identity) would prefer to join the coalition fa bg { the partition ff1g f2g f3g f4gg is not Nash stable as any p l a yer prefers to form a couple with another player. It is interesting to remark that unlike m a n y models where single-peakedness is postulated (e.g., median voting in public goods environments and uniform allocations in allotment problems), we need information about players' preferences beyond knowing what their peaks are in order to construct a stable coalition partition. This is demonstrated in the following example.
Example 12
Let n = 4 , p 1 = 2 , a n d p i = 4 for i 2 f 2 3 4g. If player 1 prefers size 4 to size 1, then ff1 2 3 4gg is the only individually stable coalition partition.
If player 1 prefers size 1 to size 4, then ff1g f2 3 4gg is the only individually stable coalition partition.
Next, we show that single-peakedness is important in establishing Theorem 2. Although it can be checked that for n 7 when players care only about coalition size, anonymity alone su ces for the existence of an individual stable coalition partition, this is not true for larger n. The following example with n = 63 is the smallest example that we know of where anonymity of preferences does not su ce for the existence of an individually stable coalition partition.
Example 13
Let n = 63. Anonymous preferences over coalition size are described below, where the argument is the size of the coalition. For players 9 to 63: single peaked with peak at 63. We v erify that there is no individually stable partition. Claim 1. Any candidate individually stable coalition structure must have p l a yers 9 to 63 together (possibly with others, too). Call this S 1 . Proof of Claim: Note from the preferences that any coalition that is closed (and that is preferred to staying alone by a l l i t s m e m bers) must be of size 7 or less or of size 57. Also note that players indexed from 9 up prefer larger to smaller, so they must all be in the largest coalition if one of the largest coalitions is open, and then this must be uniquely the largest. Suppose the claim to be false. Then it must be that all of the largest coalitions are closed. If the largest coalition has 57 members, then it must not contain any of players 3 to 8 and so contains players 9 to 63 as claimed. So it must be that all the largest coalitions are closed and of size 7 or less. Any closed coalition of size 7 or less must have a p l a yer from 1 to 8 in it. There are at most 8 such coalitions which t a k es up at most 56 players. Thus there are at least 7 remaining players who are indexed from 9 to 63 and are together in an open coalition, which t h us must have maximal size, which leads to a contradiction. Claim 2. Any candidate individually stable coalition structure must have p l a yers 4 to 8 together (possibly with others, too). Call this S 2 . As S 1 has at least 55 members, there can be at most eight remaining players in the other coalitions. None of players 4 to 8 can be in S 1 , as they would rather be alone. From the preferences it follows that any of the coalitions other than S 1 that are closed (and that are preferred to staying alone by a l l i t s m e m bers) must be of size 2 or 7. If none of the largest coalitions other than S 1 are closed, then it mu s t b e t h a t a l l o f player 4 to 8 are in it, since they prefer larger to smaller up to a size of 7. If there is a closed coalition of size 7, and the claim were not true, then there must be a player indexed 4 to 8 who is alone. However, this could not be as then player 3 would like to join this single player. Thus, for the claim to be false, it must be that all of the largest coalitions other than S 1 are closed, and they must all be of size 2 or less. Each such coalition must have a player indexed 1, 2, or 3 in it and so there are at least 2 players indexed 4 to 8 left. They would be together in an open coalition which i s a contradiction.
Claim 3. At most two of players 1, 2, and 3 are in the same coalition. If all 3 players were in the same coalition then from Claims 1 and 2 it follows that that coalition would be of size 58, 8, or 3. In any one of these cases, any of the three players would prefer to be alone. Claim 4. At least two o f p l a yers 1, 2, and 3 are in the same coalition. From Claims 1 to 3 it follows that if they were all separated, then at least one of them would have to be alone. From the preferences of player 3, it would have to be only player 3, or else he would join the single player. Thus, S 1 has 56 members, S 2 has 6 members, and player 3 is alone. This is not stable, as both players 1 and 2 prefer 7 members to 56, so whicheve r o n e o f t h e m i s i n S 1 should join S 2 .
Claims 3 and 4 tell us that exactly two o f p l a yers 1,2, and 3 are in the same coalition. Let us now consider separate cases.
Case 1: 1 and 2 are both in the same coalition. If 1, 2 are not in S 2 , t h e n i t m ust be that 3 is in S 2 . But then player 2 would like to join S 2 and would be accepted, which violates individual stability. I f 1 , 2 a r e i n S 2 , then 3 is alone, but 1 would like t o j o i n 3 a n d w ould be accepted, which violates individual stability.
Case 2: 2 and 3 are both in the same coalition. If 2, 3 are not in S 2 , t h e n i t m ust be that 1 is in S 2 . But then player 2 would like to join S 2 . Contradiction. If 2, 3 are in S 2 , then 1 is alone. But then 3 would like t o join 1. Contradiction.
Case 3: 1 and 3 are both in the same coalition. If 1, 3 are not in S 1 , t h e n i t m ust be that 2 is in S 1 . But then player 1 would like to join S 1 . Contradiction. If 1, 3 are in S 1 , then 2 is alone. But then 3 would like t o join 2. Contradiction.
The above results and examples show that there are plausible situations where individually stable coalition partitions exist, but also others where they do not. Let us brie y examine a less restrictive notion of local stability: contractual individual stability. This has the nice property o f a l w ays existing, but su ers from strong assumptions on the limits of mobility that players have. Also, as the following Proposition demonstrates, contractual individual stability h a s a n i n teresting relationship with Pareto e ciency, which follows the reasoning of Dreze and Greenberg (1980) , in a di erent context. Proof: We rst show that any P areto optimal coalition partition, , is contractually individually stable.
Consider any i, S (i), and S k 2 , where S (i) 6 = S k . Consider 0 where the only change from is that i moves from S (i) t o S k . B y t h e P areto optimality o f , i t follows that either all players are indi erent b e t ween the two partitions, or that some player j is worse o under the new partition. Since preferences are hedonic, it must be that j 2 S (i) S k . In either case, this change for i would not be viable under the de nition of contractual individual stability. Since these choices were arbitrary, i s contractually individually stable. Next, we s h o w that if preferences are strict then the following algorithm identi es a P areto e cient and individually rational coalition partition that is contractually individually stable. o is individually rational. The partition is contractually individually stable by the following reasoning. Individual i 1 = 1 is in her most preferred coalition subject to individual rationality, so she will prevent a n yone from leaving it. The only players she would admit to S 1 are ones that would rather remain alone. Given this, similar reasoning applies to each i k and S k , successively. A similar argument p r o ves Pareto e ciency: adding any players to b S 1 would make either some added player or player i 1 worse o . Subtracting players from b S 1 would make p l a yer i 1 worse o . Thus, a P areto improvement m ust leave b S 1 unchanged. Similar reasoning applies to each b S k , successively.
Concluding Remarks
We h a ve focussed on the existence of coalition partitions that are stable to the movements of one player at a time, and noted some relationships between various forms of such stability and Pareto e ciency. While existence of stable coalition partitions may be reassuring, one also cares about the properties that the stable coalition partitions will exhibit. Will they be fair, for example, treating equal players equally and being envy free? How will they adjust as the population grows? Will players have incentives to misrepresent their preferences when forming a coalition? These are important questions to address in further research.
To close, we provide a few examples that suggest that one will have t o i d e n tify special domains in order to make sure that stable coalition partitions are nicely behaved.
First, we point out that there are some very simple situations where stable partitions will necessarily treat players asymmetrically. For example, suppose that a society contains three players who care only about coalition size. They all have preferences over coalition sizes being described by 2 i 1 i 3. Here, any individually stable coalition partition (as well as core stable, Nash stable, and individually contractually stable partition) consists of two p l a yers together and one player alone. This violates most notions of fairness. 17 18 Of course, fairness in a traditional sense of full symmetry, l i k e equal treatment o f equals or envy-freeness, is generally di cult (if not impossible) to achieve in settings with indivisibilities. In our case though, fair allocations exist at the expense of e ciency 17 For example, it violates envy-freeness and equal treatment of equals. Say that a partition is envy free if S (i) i (S (j) i) n j for every i and j = 2 S (i). Say that it satis es equal treatment o f e q u a l s if S (i) i (S(j) i) n j for every i and j such t h a t i and j are the same (under a permutation of i and j).
18 The example also shows that Pareto e ciency is incompatible with fairness. This suggests that it is necessary to sacri ce symmetry and fairness in order to achieve either individual stability o r e ciency. This is not surprising in a setting with such indivisibilities, but is noteworthy nonetheless. and stability. One can simply place all players in one coalition, or leave each one alone, or divide them in groups of the same size. Another common way to restore fairness, is to allow for some randomization, and to take a n e x a n te perspective, which could be employed here.
It is worth pointing out that in our setting we can regard stability as a requirement that bears some \restricted fairness" avor. Indeed, Nash stability guarantees that any player will not be interested in joining another group. This is a weakening of an envy-freeness requirement, which demands that any p l a yer will not be interested in replacing a player in another group. Next, we p o i n t out that the set of individual stable partitions do not necessarily evolve nicely as the population size changes. Consider N = f1 2 3 4g , and the anonymous preferences that are single-peaked over coalition size represented by 2 1 1 1 3 1 4 a n d 4 i 3 i 2 i 1, for i 2 f 2 3 4g.
Start with just players 1 and 2. The unique individually stable coalition partition is ff1 2gg. Next, add players 3 and 4. The unique individually stable coalition is ff1g f2 3 4gg. Player 1 is worse o and player 2 is better o due to the arrival of the new players. This violates population monotonicity, which s a ys that players welfare should move in the same direction due to a change in population size (for example, see Thomson (1991) ). We conclude with an example showing the incentives of players to misrepresent their preferences in situations where preferences are be private information. Take n to be even and n 4. (Slight v ariations on this example work when n is odd.) If all players have p e a k n ; 1 and nd n least preferred, then the only individually stable partitions are splits into two coalitions of sizes 1 and n ; 1. Consider, any such partition, which without loss of generality w e take t o b e f1g f2 : : : n g. L e t a l l p l a yers except n have the same preferences as before, and the preferences of n change to have a peak at 2, with size 1 being least preferred. It is easy to check that here the only individually stable partition is fng f1 : : : n ;1g. Note that in the second situation, player n would be better o pretending to have a peak of n ; 1.
Thus, for n 4, there does not exist a non-manipulable rule on the domain of anonymous and single-peaked over coalition size preferences, which w ould always select an individually stable partition. This suggests di culties in combining nonmanipulability of the rule and stability of outcomes.
The above discussion points out that in addition to further study of the existence and so (ii) in the de nition of ordered characteristics implies that p i > c (S l). This implies that c(S) > c (S l), which b y Claim 1 implies that S should have been closed to l which is a contradiction. If p l > p i , then from (ii) we h a ve c(S l) p l and so l (or, by the rst part of the claim, some other player with at least as high a peak) would have been added to S during the time when S was formed. Claim 7 When S k is being formed, c(S k ) does not increase if i is moved from S k to S l , k > l , i.e. c(S k ; i) c(S k ). Let j be the last player added to S k before i is moved. We h a ve that c(S k ; j) c(S k ). Since p j p i , (ii) implies that c(S k ;i) = c((S k ;i;j) j) c((S k ;i;j) i) = c(S k ; j) c(S k ). Claim 8 c(S k ) p j for all j 2 S k except if j was moved to S k from some S`with> k . This is true when j enters by the de nition of the algorithm, If p j > c (S k ) at the time a new player l is admitted it follows from Claim 5 that p j c(S k l). If p j = c(S k ) and a new player l is admitted then it must be that c(S k ) = c(S k l). Finally, b y Claim 7 the desired inequality remains true when some player is moved from S k . Claim 9 After a rst player i is moved from S k , c(S k ) cannot grow b e y ond the value it had just before i left.
By Claims 7 and 8 it follows that c(S k ; i) c(S k ) min j2S k p j (in particular, c(S k ; i) p i ). If c(S k ; i) 2 f p j jj 2 S k ; ig, then it will not change if a new players is added, or j would block such an addition. Suppose that c(S k ; i) < min j2S k ;i p j , and hence c(S k ; i) = # S k ; 1 and either c(S k ) = c(S k ; i) = # S k ; 1 = p i or c(S k ) = # S k min j2S k p j . Suppose that some player x is added to S k ; i. B y ( i i ) , c(S k ; i x) c(S k ; i i) = c(S k ). If p x c(S k ; i x), then the choice c( ) o f this coalition will not change subsequently. I f c(S k ; i x) < p x , t h e n c(S k ; i x) = #S k = c(S k ) < p x min j2S k p j . This implies that c(S k + x) = # S + 1 min j2S k x p j , and so x (or, by Claim 6, some other player with a peak at least as high) would be added to S k before i was moved. Claim 10 After some player i is moved to S k from a coalition with higher number for the rst time, the choice of the coalition will not change (if any other players are also added).
By Claim 8 c(S k ) min j2S k p j . T h us, the only situation where S k i c a n b e o p e n to new players who change its choice is if c(S k i) min j2S k i p j = p i . But in this case i (or some other player with a peak at least as high) would be added to S k when it was originally formed. Let us now v erify that the resulting coalition partition is individually stable.
Consider the incentives of a player i 2 S k to move t o s o m e o p e n S k 0 where k 0 < k .
By Claims 3, 4 and 5, it follows that c(S k 0 i) c(S k 0) p i > c (S k ). By the de nition of the algorithm and Claim 2 it follows that c(S k 0 i) > p i > c (S k ), or else i (or some other player with at least as high a peak, given (ii)) would have been added to S k 0 during the step where S k 0 was formed. Consider the last time that i was o ered a chance to move to a larger coalition. She did not prefer S k 0 over S k at that time, and nobody from S k was moved to a lower indexed coalition after that. By Claim 2, neither c(S k ) n o r c(S k 0) could have decreased since that point. So, since i did not prefer S k 0 over S k when she got the last chance to move, then she will not want t o m o ve in the nal partition. This implies that it must be that c(S h;1 i) = p i < c (S h;1 ), or else S h;1 would not be closed to i. By consistency (iii) it follows that c(T (i)) p i which c o n tradicts the fact that c(T (i)) > c (S h;1 ) p i .
Case 2. min j2S h;1 p j c(S h;1 ). By observation 3 it follows that min j2S h;1 p j < c (S h;1 ). This implies that j was moved to S h;1 from some S k with k > k h;1 . By the reasoning above and condition (ii), it also follows that j was o ered the opportunity t o m o ve t o S h;1 before i was and so k h k. Since c(T (j)) j c(S h;1 ), this implies by Claim 9 that c(T (j)) > c (S k ), which b y Claim 4 implies that c(T (j)) > c (S h ). Thus, c(S h ) < c (T (j)) c(S h;1 ), which c o n tradicts our supposition.
Finally, a contradiction is reached from observation 4 which implies that the population comprising T must be larger than that comprising .
